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Abstract
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the phenomenological notion of embodiment, to explain
the objectification and coercion that women and their bodies experience on a daily basis. I build
the philosophical foundation of this thesis on Husserlian and Merleau-Pontian phenomenology,
as well as, their work’s receptions in feminist philosophy of the early 20th century, mainly
Simone de Beauvoir, as well as, more contemporary thinkers like Luce Irigaray and Judith
Butler. Moreover, the thesis argues for a return to the traditional phenomenological notion of
embodiment while incorporating elements of sexuality and sexual difference.
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Introduction

I.

The Problem of Embodiment

As we observe the world around us, the first thing we notice is our body. Once we realize this
is our body, we look away and see how others and the world interact and react to us, especially
our body. And most of the time, it is our body and its features to set the tone for how we will
be treated; i.e., the color of our skin, our gender, if our hair is covered or not, the shape of our
body, and much more. In a way there exists a hierarchy of bodies whereby certain types of
bodies are preferred over others, particularly male ones. Regardless of race, class, and socioeconomic background the body of a man is almost always primal to the body of a woman.
Nonetheless, female bodies, despite their lower stance on the hierarchy of bodies seem
to always be at the center of social and political issues such as; sexual harassment, reproductive
rights, sexuality, motherhood, sex trafficking, unequal pay, and objectification only to mention
a few. Why is the scrutinization of the bodies of women so important? And often done under
the public eye, as if the female flesh is to be shared, used, abused, and shamed.
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the phenomenological notion of embodiment
to explain the otherness and oppression of the bodies of women. More importantly, how can a
feminist reading and critique help develop said notion. I ground my method in the works of
Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and their work’s receptions in feminist
philosophy of the early 20th century, mainly Simone de Beauvoir, as well as, more
contemporary thinkers like Luce Irigaray, Judith Butler, and Elizabeth Grosz. What does
Husserlian and Merleau-Pontian embodiment have to offer to feminist phenomenology
of the 21st Century?
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The thesis aims to contribute to current feminist literature through the reworking of
Husserlian embodiment, as it has been neglected notwithstanding new interpretations12 that
open up possibilities for discussions. This is in striking contrast to the greater engagements
Merleau-Ponty’s texts have received from feminist scholars, beginning with Simone De
Beauvoir. Nevertheless, in the feminist reading and critique of embodiment more fundamental
issues remain. Thus, the thesis proposes to strip embodiment of excessive levels of analysis
and rework the notion to provide a more inclusive definition.
The question of embodiment and the role the body has in people’s lives is not one that
is asked simply because one perceives it while looking at its reflection in the mirror, or because
feet become cold as they touch the ground in the morning. The body is not a mere bundle of
nerves and neurotransmissions, a vessel, an object. The body is at the center of human
subjective experience. To understand, describe, and analyze said experience one must inquire
on what “makes” people embodied, if they are at all. In order to do so, the standing point of
the thesis is the phenomenological one. Before gender, race, class, and religion there is a subject
in the world experiencing it first-hand.
What is Phenomenology then? It is the study of consciousness’ structures and
subjective experience3. This philosophy studies all of which is taken for granted by modernity
and its scientific developments; the subject is allowed to perceive the world, and it does not
pretend it is a mere appearance, or an illusion of the mind. The world is real and it is connected
to the subject in a real way. These statements, may very well be refuted by philosophies, as

1

This point refers to the works of philosopher Dan Zahavi, Alia El-Saji, and Linda Fisher.
Linda Fisher, “Feminist Phenomenology,” in Feminist Phenomenology, ed. Linda Fisher and Lester Embree
(Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht, 2000), 1-15.
3
Nevertheless, there is no actual standard definition of phenomenology, since it evolved throughout the years
based on the epistemological or ontological focus of the philosophers included in this literature review.
However, Taylor Carman in the forward to the Phenomenology of Perception defines it as “…an attempt to
describe the basic structures of human experience and understanding from a first-person point of view, in
contrast to the reflective, third person perspective that tends to dominate scientific knowledge and common
sense”. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans Donald A. Landes (London: Routledge,
2012) viii.
2
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well as, sciences which stand on the opposite side of the spectrum or simply hold a different
view of the world. Nevertheless, phenomenology is most suitable for this thesis because it
allows to question embodiment through an epistemological lens; do subjects know by being
embodied? But also, an ontological one; what does it mean to be embodied. Phenomenology,
is still fighting for the importance of philosophy in the face of science which is especially
salient at the moment due to the amazing developments in the latter, as well as, philosophy of
science.
By reading Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, a pure description of experience becomes
possible. The phenomenological method provides insights on the essence of being and the
structure of conscious knowledge. Moreover, there is an urgency to understand embodiment
and develop it further in the 21st century, because of issues like sexuality, scientific progress in
the fields of artificial intelligence and body prosthesis, the increasing demand of being beautiful
and its effects on the subject’s existence, self and other body perception in multicultural, deeply
intertwined, societies which still suffer from structural forms of racism, xenophobia, and
misogyny. Can defining embodiment point out to the lives that matter more than others, do all
lives really matter?
Thus, the thesis argues for a return to the traditional phenomenological notion of
embodiment while incorporating elements of sexuality and sexual difference. In order to
make this argument, there are three main questions that must be addressed, each in a separate
chapter. The first chapter What is Embodiment? Between Husserl and Merleau-Ponty,
examines in detail the meaning and definitions of embodiment in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty’s
philosophies. The chapter’s main goal is to provide a phenomenological definition of
embodiment, identify the epistemic and ontological dimensions, as well as, its drawbacks. The
second chapter What About the Female Body? A Feminist Critique provides a critical feminist
reading of embodiment in the works of both Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. The chapter aims at
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problematizing this notion in relation to gender. Lastly, the third and final chapter Returning
to the Phenomenological Body, asks the basic question of what can be done better? How can
one build on the philosophical drawbacks of Husserlian and Merleau-Pontian embodiment,
integrating the feminist standpoint in order to provide an overreaching and more inclusive
definition of embodiment?
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Chapter One
Embodiment: Between Husserl and Merleau-Ponty

The purpose of this chapter is to explain the meaning of embodiment and identify the role of
the body in the philosophies of Edmund Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. Both philosophers belong
to the phenomenological tradition, yet; as Carman points out the disparity and differences in
terminology and the meaning embodiment holds for Husserl and Merleau-Ponty should not be
overlooked4. This difference is not a mere translation/language issue, but it derives from their
Philosophies’ fundamental principles.
The chapter explores the two definitions chronologically, covering the time frame from
1880 to 1980. The chapter is structured in said manner to demarcate the development of
embodiment from Husserl to Merleau-Ponty, highlighting the shift from the early focus on the
epistemological dimension of lived embodiment, as being part of the structures of knowing, to
the ontological interpretations of the concept. The review demonstrates that MerleauPonty’s view of embodiment opens up a particular dimension to the body that is not
addressed by Husserl, and that makes his approach particularly relevant for feminist
theories of embodiment addressed in Chapter Two.

I.

Body and Embodiment in Phenomenology: A Brief Overview

What is the body? In a way the body is the most natural, familiar, and self-evident thing
perceived, and yet, it is also the object of intense examination. The body has been considered
in dialectical relations as opposed to the mind, the soul, and/or consciousness such as; subjectobject, same-other, and/or present-absent. The body has also been viewed as a oneness with

4

Taylor Carman, “The Body in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty,” Philosophical Topics 27, no.2 (1999): 205-226.
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one’s consciousness, or as separate from it. According to anthropologist Mary Douglas5, the
body is a powerful symbolic form which creates, but also adapts to rules and hierarchies. The
body is at the center of culture and folklore by being trained, disciplined, forbidden, sexualized,
and objectified through activities such as eating, dressing, and speaking for example. But the
body can also have a strong political role if it becomes the location of social control, as argued
by Foucault6.Throughout the history of philosophy, many different attitudes, approaches, and
perspectives have been offered about the body.
The notion of embodiment is not original and limited to the field of phenomenology,
but it has been examined in multiple fields and eras of philosophy. In each phase, embodiment
held a different meaning. For example, with the recent developments in philosophy of cognitive
science, embodiment can be understood as body-functionalism, whereby the body is basically
a machine responsible for the computation of cognitive capacities. Embodiment is also
understood as body-enactivism, whereby it becomes the source of meaning by making
situations meaningful, the body can enact7.
Nevertheless, it was one of the fundamental achievements of phenomenology to
question the traditional place of the body in the history of philosophy. Husserl8 highlighted the
centrality of embodiment and identified the body as a center of lived experience that is capable
of motion, which he later identified as kinesthetic consciousness. However, in his
development of embodiment, Husserl still separated the subject from the pre-given world. In
response to Husserl, Heidegger for instance, emphasized Dasein which rejects the subjectobject division, since being in the world entails inseparability from it. The subject is not a
5

Susan Bordo, Unbearable weight: Feminism, Western culture, and the body (Los Angeles: Univ of California
Press, 1995), 165-167.
6
Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books,
1995), 135-149.
7
Julian Kiverstein, “The Meaning of Embodiment,” Topics in Cognitive Science 4, no.1 (2012): 740-741.
8
See Edmund Husserl, Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy:
Second book studies in the phenomenology of constitution, trans Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer (The
Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers,1989).
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spectator interacting with objects outside of him/herself, but is embedded in the world as part
of his/her ontology9. Moreover, Heidegger’s main task is to access being (Sein) through human
experience as Dasein, which is further elaborated by Sartre10 who differentiates between being
and knowing through three ontological dimensions.
As discussed by Moran11, Sartre’s three ontological dimensions of existence are as
follows; first, the body lived first-hand, which is not an object. The second is the understanding
of the materialization of the objective body as studied in the sciences. In this second ontology,
Sartre also speaks of the instrumentalization of such a body, picked up from Heidegger12, and
on which the concept of Otherness is built, and later borrowed by Simone De Beauvoir. The
third ontological dimension, as Dillon13 puts it, discusses the-body-for-itself-for-others. He
argues for a social understanding of an intercorporeal, intersubjective Dasein, who does not
experience his/her own body alone but also as experienced by others.
In more recent developments such as post-phenomenology’s, the focus shifts from the
human body to the non-human bodies that shape the world 14. Ash and Simpson15 argue that
this new stream attempts to examine the constitution of the subject through its experience of
the world, which is similar to Merleau-Ponty’s view of subjectivity but also attributes a role to
inanimate objects in the creation of the socialized body. This distancing from the human body
gave rise to an interest from the side of analytic philosophers such as J.N Mohanty16 and Gilbert

9

Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (USA: State University of New York Press, 1996),
229.
10
Jean-Paul, Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hanzel E. Barnes (New York: Washington Square Press, 1992)
11
Dermot Moran, "Revisiting Sartre's Ontology of Embodiment in Being and Nothingness," In Ontological
Landscapes—Recent Thought on Conceptual Interfaces between Science and Philosophy, ed. by Petrov Vesselin
(Ontos Verlag, 2011), 263-293.
12
The body as an instrument among instruments – Zuhandensein. As seen in Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark A.
Wrathall, A Companion to Heidegger, (USA: John Wiley & Sons, 2005), 214.
13
Martin C. Dillon, "Sartre on the Phenomenal Body and Merleau-Ponty's Critique," Journal of the British Society
for Phenomenology 5, no. 2 (1974): 144-158.
14
See Don Ihde, Postphenomenology: Essays in the Postmodern Context, (USA: Northwest University of Press,
1995).
15
James Ash and Paul Simpson, "Geography and Post-Phenomenology," Progress in Human Geography 40, no.1
(2016): 48-66.
16
See Dermot Moran and Rasmus Thybo Jensen, The Phenomenology of Embodied Subjectivity. Vol. 71. (New
York: Springer, 2013).
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Ryle17 who re-explored phenomenology more generally under the umbrella of the philosophy
of mind, but preferred the Husserlian version. However, on this view, embodiment is conceived
as embodied cognition, where a stronger focus is on consciousness and the body becomes a
mere vessel of the latter once again.18
Hence, the chapter discards this final view as irrelevant to its scope. In contrast, it
supports a return to a Husserlian and Merleau-Pontian notion of embodiment, as their
understanding unify19 two important elements of analysis for the task at hand, the body and the
world. The turn, is motivated by three meanings embodiment holds, as Dreyfus20 lists them, in
Merleau-Ponty, embodiment is physical, comprising the subject and the flesh; embodiment is
bodily skills and situational responses, which draws from Husserl’s previously mentioned
kinesthetic consciousness; and finally, embodiment is the cultural knowledge learned from the
world in which we are embedded, reconnecting to Heidegger’s discussion on Dasein’s
inseparability from the world, as well as, to Sartre’s complex third ontological dimension
which leads to an understanding of the socialized experience of the subject by other subjects.
This last meaning provides the space to understand embodiment in terms of subjective
embodiment, as well as, intersubjective embodiment without objectifying the body of the
experiencer and ultimately leading to the feminist turn discussed in Chapter Two of the thesis.

II.

Edmund Husserl

Husserlian phenomenology is rooted in the intentionality of consciousness, how the latter
constitutes21 the body, and its role in perceptual experience. As Husserl discussed in Logical
17

Ibid, 71
For more reading on the matter see George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, (USA: University
of Chicago Press, 2008) and Francisco J. Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleonor Rosch, The embodied mind:
Cognitive science and human experience, (USA: MIT Press, 2016).
19
By unify I mean bring together, not discard/ prefer one or the other.
20
Hubert L. Dreyfus, "The Current Relevance of Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Embodiment," The
Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy 4, no.4 (1996): 1-16.
21
The term constitution is a technical term for Husserl, and refers to the correlation between experiencing and the
that which is experienced. Further elaboration of the concept can be found in Edmund Husserl, Ideas II, 6.
18
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Investigations22and Ideas I23, intentionality generally refers to a subject’s intentions to act, but
also to any thought directed at objects outside of oneself. To provide a systematic
understanding of intentionality, Husserl devises three structural elements; the intentional act
(the subject’s intention to do something such as; perceiving and remembering for example),
the intentional object (object-directed thought – this refers to the content of the act the subject
is doing), and intentional content (the way the subject thinks of the object). For example, I see
(intentional act) a tree (intentional object) as big as a house (intentional content)24. The first
two elements of intentionality are the most important to the current discussion because
intentionality can be understood as a correlation between the subject (I) and the object (the
tree), but also as a difference which separates the subject from the object.
The creation of a difference between the subject and the object leads to two fundamental
pairs of dichotomies in Husserlian phenomenology, first; the immanent, the inner sphere of
conscious experience, and the transcendent, the outer sphere belonging to external objects
outside of oneself. By starting from the subject’s inner sphere, he turned to the first-person
point of view reclaiming the role of the body as more than a vessel radically separated from
consciousness. His reflections on the body and embodied personhood first begin with the
critique, as well as, the rejection of the mainstream philosophy and science of his time; a
rejection implemented in order to discover truth and to make a radical turn in philosophy25.
Second, the difference between the real and the ideal. This is the most pivotal of all relations
and differentiations, because it is at the base of how he categorizes the body. As W. R. Boyce
Gibson simplifies it, for Husserl there are three main types of object; the real (the thing, the

22

Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, trans. J.N. Findlay (London: Routledge, 2001).
Edmund Husserl, Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy: First
Book General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, trans. F. Kersten (The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 1982).
24
Ibid
25
Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, trans. Dorion Cairns (The
Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999), 1-4
23
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real object sciences empirically observe), the irreal (this is a kind of perfect form of the object
– here Husserl refers to transcendentally purified experiences), and the Wesen or Essence (what
Husserlian phenomenology is mainly concerned with, specifically “…the essential nature of
that irreal form of Being he calls Pure Consciousnes”)26.
How does this relate to the body? If there are different types of objects, to which category
does our body belong to? Is it a real object, an irreal one, or a Wesen?
A possible answer can be found in this key passage in the Cartesian Meditations:
“Among the bodies belonging to this "Nature" and included in my peculiar
ownness, I then find my animate organism as uniquely singled out - namely as the only
one of them that is not just a body but precisely an animate organism: the sole Object within
my abstract world-stratum to which, in accordance with experience, I ascribe fields of
sensation (belonging to it, however, in different manners a field of tactual sensations, a
field of warmth and coldness, and so forth), the only Object "in" which I "rule and govern"
immediately, governing particularly in each of its "organs"”27.
There are different thing-like bodies belonging to Nature, there exists a biological body, a
physical and real object (Körper28) which belongs to my inner subjective sphere. And then
there is also the animate organism or lived Body29, situated at the center of subjective
experience; named Leib30. The animate organism is the only Object31 within the abstract, the
ideal, sphere of my experience which does experience in different ways. When Husserl says
that this Object/Body is ruled and governed by oneself, he describes it as an immediate rule to
avoid being misunderstood. He does not view the Body as a puppet attached to strings moved
by consciousness. It actually is the center of our own experience of the world by the intimate

26

W.R. Boyce Gibson, " The Problem of Real and Ideal in the Phenomenology of Husserl," Mind 34, no. 135
(1925): 311-333.
27
Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, 97.
28
The German form of the word was retrieved from Edmund Husserl, Ideas II, 14-15, as Cairns did not include
it in the text of this specific passage.
29
Body is capitalized to differentiate it from the biological body, since for Husserl the body and Body are two
different types of object.
30
Ibid, 14-15.
31
Object in this context refers to the German form, Objekt and not Gegenstand which would have been written
in English as object without the capitalization of the O. Gegenstand is used to refer to real objects outside of
oneself, which does not apply to the body.

14

connection between consciousness and the Body. This is a necessary distinction that needs to
be drawn before any inquiry on the body is pursued, since the interplay between Körper and
Leib32 two fundamentally inseparable sides of the subject’s body, pave the way for the
discussion on embodiment. The body is experienced as an object in the world, while the Body
experiences things that are worldly. However, even if the body is experienced as an object of
intentionality, it is not an extended non-thinking physical substance, as Descartes claims33.
The Husserlian account of the body and of being embodied is in striking contrast to the one
provided by the then prevailing Cartesian dualist interpretation. Husserl particularly disliked
the naturalist tradition34 because it inherited the Cartesian dualist understanding of substances
as res extensa35 and res cogitans36. This clear-cut division and difference in substances is not
the only problem. Naturalism and the empirical sciences more generally, approached
consciousness and the body as mathematizable things. After separating them, they attempted
to connect the two substances psychophysically, in a way that it presupposed the human body
to be an object like any other if not inhabited, connected, or controlled by consciousness.
For a phenomenologist like Husserl, who wants to access consciousness through lived firsthand experience, the main drawback of this approach was the absence of the embodied
body,which is not constituted by bodily acts, but intentionally through the reflexive relation
which is created as one perceives one of the organs (i.e. hand) with another (i.e. eye)3738 .

32

Both Körper and Leib refer to the English word body, and in order to differentiate between them the thesis
implements the same method that Rojcewicz and Schuwer implemented in translating Ideas II. This is the standard
and most popular translation of the two words while reading Husserl’s translated work.
33
René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. John Cottingham (UK: Cambridge University
Press,1996), 54.
34
Husserl defines it as “…a phenomenon consequent upon the discovery of nature, which is to say of nature
considered as a unity of spatio-temporal being subject to exact laws of nature” in Edmund Husserl and Quentin
Lauer, "Philosophy as a strict science," Cross Currents 6, no. 4 (1956): 325-344. More generally, Naturalism is
viewed and understood as an approach which examines philosophical problems through empirical sciences
without the employment of a priori knowledge/ theorization.
35
Body
36
Mind
37
Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, 96-98.
38
Another important term here is body intentionality, which Taylor Carman defines as “the immediate sense of
embodied agency we are familiar with, and that we all take for granted”. Taylor Carman, “The Body in Husserl
and Merleau-Ponty,” 211.
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Husserl further explains that this difference lays in the way body and consciousness interact.
This interaction unfolds as the body mundanizes consciousness, it makes it worldly. It is only
through its experiential relation to the Leib that consciousness becomes human. Only then,
consciousness becomes part of Nature by occupying a place in both space and time39.
Consciousness is mundanized by being embodied within the natural world. By being embodied
in a Körper, consciousness acquires the characteristics of being “here and now” through the
intentive relation to the corporeal being which it embodies. On the other hand, the Körper
becomes animated by consciousness turning into Husserl’s Leib. Hence, the importance of the
conceptual distinction40. It is in fact this conceptual distinction that separates Husserl from his
contemporaries. By elucidating the distinction between the body and the Body of embodiment,
he is challenging naturalists and empiricists, but he is not challenging the practice of medical
professionals approaching the living body as something empirically observable for example41.
In very simple words, Husserl is highlighting the idea that there is more to the body
than its physiology, and that consciousness cannot be empirically examined. He does so in
three main literary steps; in Ideas I42 he develops his philosophical foundations focusing on
consciousness and intentionality without mentioning the body (as seen by Naturalists). In Ideas
II43 he brings back the Body, but not the Körper, rather the body which experiences and is
experienced, the embodied body, Leib. Finally, in Ideas III44, the physiological and the
phenomenological merge; in fact, Husserl proposes a new science, somatology, incorporating
both the material and the experiential methods of investigations.

39

Acquiring that spatio-temporal character naturalist attributed to the body as inanimate object.
Edmund Husserl, Ideas II, 14-15.
41
Alfred Schuetz, “Die Phaenomenologie und die Fundamente der Wissenschaften (Ideas III. by Edmund
Husserl),” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 13, no.4 (1953): 506-514.
42
Edmund Husserl, Ideas I.
43
Edmund Husserl, Ideas II.
44
Edmund Husserl, Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy: Third
book phenomenology and the foundations of the sciences, trans. Ted E. Klein and William E. Pohl (The
Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1980).
40
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The Body discussed in Ideas II, is examined in relation to the Lebenswelt or lifeworld.
This is the cultural world, the world infused with social interactions and encounters; all of
which with other embodied subjects. The latter is vital in his understanding of embodiment,
because when we do encounter others, we see a whole embodied subject, we do not look at
them and think “Here is Sarah! A pile of bones animated by consciousness, an immaterial thing
working like a battery”. Instead, there is an immediacy in my reaction to her presence; a
handshake, a hug, or any other culturally specific norm used to greet another person. And as I
greet her, I do not think of the neurotransmissions occurring in my body.
This is mainly due to the way the subject is constituted, the way it is given the “here
and now” status with embodied consciousness through the lived Body. But again, what is this
Body? Where does it belong? This passage and the discussion around it, may help further
clarify the body and embodiment:
“The same Body which serves me as means for all my perception obstructs me
in the perception of itself and is a remarkably imperfectly construed thing” 45
Husserl is explicitly referring to the idea that embodiment is twofold. On one hand there
is the Body, which allows us to perceive by being the subject of perception. On the other hand,
there is the body which is the perceived object, even if he writes, is imperfectly perceived by
oneself. And so, in a way his ideas return to a dualism, but different from the Cartesian one. It
is a conceptual dualism dictated by his dogmatic metaphysical statements on consciousness
and the world, he calls it an “abyss of meaning”46, and unfortunately this conceptual dualism
inhibits the body from being the source on intentional phenomena with regards to perceptual
experience; this is because of the detachability the world from the realm of consciousness4748.

45

Edmund Husserl, Ideas II, 167.
Edmund Husserl, Ideas I, §93.
47
Ibid, §76-86
48
The clearest example of this detachability is the epoché, also known as the transcendental reduction. A more
detailed explanation can be found in Ibid, § 31-34 and §56 to 64.
46
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Moreover, embodiment itself is both extended and physical, the dualism lays in the kind of
objects (bodies) that Husserl identifies not in the difference between body/Body and
consciousness. Again, the key to Husserlian embodiment is not in the difference in substance,
but it is in its twofold-ness49. And again, even if there is a material side to embodiment it does
not mean that we can be moved, touched, looked at, or spoken to passively. Every person
experiences all which is externally affecting them subjectively!
The famous example provided by Husserl to explain double sensation50 is the one of the
touching hands. With my left hand I touch my right hand, and here I have two experiential
possibilities. I can focus on the material characteristics of my right hand; smoothness, warmth,
shape, colour etc… Or, I can focus on the subjective sensing of my left hand51. Double
sensation is not however, multiple sensations running back and forth through our nerves and
connective tissues, but rather two separate experiences. I have both the object sensation and
the subject sensation. I am simultaneously the object of intentionality, as well as, its subject52.
Nonetheless, even if the Body is capable of this double sensing, it still does not occupy a
center place in his phenomenology. It is quite the opposite for Merleau-Ponty, who in fact,
situates the body in the middle, the conceptual space where the world and consciousness
occupy the same place. Finally, it should be noted that the mind-body problem was never the
main question asked by Husserl. It was the “things in themselves” that interested him the most.
Unlike Merleau-Ponty, who will not only ask about the mind-body dualism, but will reject and
overcome it.
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III.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty

As a continuation, but also development of Husserl’s work, in the Phenomenology of
Perception53, Merleau-Ponty’s approach to le corps propre54 is neither biological nor
mechanical55. Just like Husserl56, Merleau-Ponty begins his inquiry by rejecting classical
psychology and embracing the Gestalt one. The rejection of the former is dictated by the way
it views the body, as Merleau-Ponty writes57:
“When classical psychology described one’s own body, it already attributed
“characteristics” to it that are incompatible with the status of an object. It first claimed
that my body is distinguished from the table or the lamp because my body is constantly
perceived, whereas I can turn away from these other objects. Thus, my body is an
object that is always with me”.
Merleau-Ponty views this distinction between the body as an object and other objects
as a contradiction. How can the body be an object whereas the one vital characteristic of objects
is the subject’s ability to turn away from them, while the body is an object constantly
perceived? Another way of formulating the question is; if the perception of objects is not
constant, but the body is an object constantly perceived, why is the body considered an object?
In fact, he continues and explains58:
…But then, is it still an object? If an object is an invariable structure, this is not
in spite of the change of perspectives, but rather in this change, or through it.The
always new perspectives are not, for the object, a simple opportunity to manifest its
permanence or a contingent manner of appearing to us. It is only an object in front of
us because it is observable, which is to say, situated at our fingertips or at the end of
our gaze, indivisibly overthrown and rediscovered by each of their movements.
Otherwise, the object would be true in the manner of an idea and not present in the
manner of a thing. In particular, the object is only an object if it can be moved away
and ultimately disappear from my visual field. Its presence is such that it requires a
possible absence.”
53
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In a way, Merleau-Ponty is asking the same question as Husserl; what kind of object is
my body, if it is an object all? For Merleau-Ponty, the body is a different kind of object, it is
an object in the empirical sense that is examined. However, the permanence of the body, its
omnipresence, makes it different from the table, the chair, the bottle, perceived by the
perceiver. Merleau-Ponty criticised the classical psychological understanding of the body
because it treated it the way a lamp is, simultaneously attributing to it characteristics that do
not belong to objects. In this case, the ability to “move it away” from oneself. One cannot take
his/her body away from him/herself. And this, is an indirect, yet important similarity in attitude
with Husserl. They both say there is something different about one owns body. For Husserl is
the fact that it cannot be perfectly perceived; while for Merleau-Ponty is that my own body
cannot be moved away from me. It seems as if the body is situated – metaphorically speakingbetween the natural world and consciousness for Husserl; and within the world for MerleauPonty.
The understanding of the body being an object immerse in the world and that cannot be
moved away from oneself, can be traced to Merleau-Ponty’s embrace of Gestaltheorie. It is a
way of breaking away from the empiricism which treated the body like an object. His
excitement for this, then new, theory of psychology and perception is evident, as he writes:
“The figure on a ground, the simplest “Etwas”- the Gestalt contains the key to
the problem of the mind59”
The Gestalt is not just a school of psychology, but it is also the primal level of
perceptual experience for him. Merleau-Ponty infuses the perceived world with so much
meaning and value constantly giving and taking to and from our lives, and bodies. This choice
is vital because by embracing the latter school of psychology, the divide between the
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mechanical physical object performing functions such as movement, and the body as embodied
is no longer there; or at least not as clear as in Husserl. For Merleau-Ponty the body is the thing
through which we sense and live experience, which can be connected to Husserlian double
sensing. We are not in a body, the body is not a container, instead it constitutes the experience
of the world and of being in it. There is a profound sense that one is his/her body60. This is
embodiment that element of existence that allows one to be a subject and not merely a body,
an object, among others.
For Merleau-Ponty, in a way, embodiment is the actualization of one’s existence. At
this point, it is important to note that for Husserl, the body and embodiment are part of his
system of intentionality; however, for Merleau-Ponty the question of embodiment is far more
vital. For the former, the intentionality of consciousness is at the center, while for the latter it
is bodily intentionality. In his philosophy, Merleau-Ponty blurs the line between thoughts and
sensations and does not relegate them to two different spheres of experience like Husserl; but
he links them through perception61. Thoughts and sensations can only take place against the
background of perceptual activity understood in bodily relations. As Merleau-Ponty reads Ideas
II, he points out something he believes is lacking from the two-folded Body of Husserl; he
asks:
“Then what link is there between my body and me in addition to the regularities
of occasional causality? There is a relation of my body to itself which makes it the
vinculum of the self and things. When my right hand touches my left, I am aware of it
as a ‘physical thing.’ But at the same moment, if I wish, an extraordinary event takes
place: here is my left hand as well starting to perceive my right, es wird Leib, es
empfindet. The physical thing becomes animate. Or, more precisely, it remains what it
was (the event does not enrich it), but an explanatory power comes to rest upon or dwell
in it. Thus I touch myself touching; my body accomplishes ‘a sort of reflection.’ In it,
through it, there is not just the unidirectional relationship of the one who perceives to
60
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what he perceives. The relationship is reversed, the touched hand becomes the touching
hand, and I am obliged to say that the sense of touch here is diffused into the body –
the body is a ‘perceiving thing’ a ‘subject-object’”62
The goal of this passage is to show that this strict dichotomy, this twofold-ness, of subject and
object, Körper and Leib, cannot fully flash out the importance of the body. He says:
" If the distinction between subject and object is blurred in my body, it is also
blurred in the thing, which is the pole of my body’s operations, the terminus its
exploration ends up in, and which is thus woven into the same intentional fabric as my
body”63
For Merleau-Ponty this distinction is counterproductive and as seen in his interpretation
of the hand example, confusing. The Körper “element” of embodiment is what is problematic
for Merleau-Ponty. Accordingly, the existence of other objects really prevents my body from
being an object, as well as, being “completely constituted”64. However, both agree on the fact
that our bodies cannot touch or see themselves like they touch or see other objects; thus,
returning to the initial point of the section. But what is the body then for Merleau-Ponty?
In his own words the body is “our anchorage in a world”65, it is “our general means of
having a world”66. What does this entail? It entails a greater centrality for the body since
perception and existence are essentially bodily. As he writes “My body is my point of view
upon the world”67 . It is my point of view upon the world because my body is not a mere object
in the world, since the line between me and the world is not so demarcated, but also because it
provides me with the background of perceptual necessity where all happens. According to
Merleau-Ponty, our body is necessary to experience the world, it is not possible to perceive by
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bracketing68 out the natural attitude69 of my body. And so, this points towards a very different
standpoint from the Husserlian one. If it was consciousness for Husserl, it is the body and
perception for Merleau-Ponty.
Another important point of comparison is language. French does not have an equivalent
for Körper and Leib, it does not allow that kind of differentiation which however, is not the
reason why Merleau-Ponty strays from that conceptual dualism. Instead, he refers to the body
as corps and adds attributes to define it, such as propre 70. An additional key word for him is
chair, what is referred to as flesh. This specific delineation of the body stresses on its
materiality and connection to the world. By this, I do not mean the materiality of Husserl’s
Körper, but rather the double sensing and twofold-ness of the embodied Body71. It refers to the
experience of materiality, the experience of bodily functions not simply in relation to the bones,
muscles, and nerves. But rather, the le corps fonctionnant similar to what Husserl would refer
to as functioning I. Both signify the body at work, the body which is the epicenter of doing, as
well as, the body to which things happen72. By that I meant the things which happen to us
passively, like falling, forgetting, or feeling sad all of the sudden for example.
For Merleau-Ponty, the body is also our way of confronting reality; a reality that is
always pre-given. Just like Husserl, Merleau-Ponty speaks of a pre-world, pre-subject, pre-I,
and the prefix refers not to precedent spatio-temporal position, but to an embodied past73. If
the body has different attributes, it experiences and is experienced in the world, what is
embodiment then? If for Husserl it is the locus of experience and movement, for Merleau-Ponty
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is the perpetuity of existence, is that which allows me to know I am myself and my body, is the
awareness of being in the world and of perceiving.74
What then, can these two similar yet contrasting views on the body and embodiment
have to offer to feminist theory? What dimensions of the Leib and le corps propre may be of
interest to Feminism? If phenomenology is concerned with first-hand subjective experience
and its description, and the body is the most central in our experience of the world, does its
gender matter? Does it matter if the subject describing experience is a woman, a man, or
identifies outside of the binary spectrum of gender? These questions are addressed in the
following chapter.
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Chapter Two
What About the Female Body? A Feminist Critique

The issue of gender and sexuality can be the object of research, and research done
through a feminist stand point has the potential of becoming an epistemological approach to
the experience of being in the world. Rethinking and reworking a concept of embodiment that
overcomes the traditional dichotomies of mind/body and subject/object is difficult but it must
be done. Feminist theory has developed literature on various issues concerning embodiment
such as constitution, intentionality, subjectivity, intersubjectivity, empathy, affect, and more.
Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to locate the feminist turn in phenomenology and provide
a feminist reading of Husserl and Merleau-Pontian embodiment. What do these two
philosophers have to offer to contemporary feminists? Is the feminist reading of classical
phenomenology satisfactory?

I.

Simone de Beauvoir and the Feminist Turn in Phenomenology

Regardless of the ways in which the body is defined, conceptualized, or situated within the
world, the body of a man has always been primal in relation to the body of a woman. In order
to understand and systematically develop this statement, it is important to begin by locating the
feminist turn in phenomenology. The latter can be found in Simone de Beauvoir’s reading of
Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception75.
In The Second Sex76, Beauvoir expounded on Sartre’s notion of the Other to delineate
a subject in a state of alienation, who refuses to experience her own subjectivity, and instead
identifies with the look of the other. She draws a connection between this otherness and the

75

Simone de Beauvoir wrote a review essay of Merleau-Ponty’s book, La phénoménologie de la perception de
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, which first appears in Les temps modernes in 1945.
76
Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, trans. H.M. Parshley (New York: Vintage Books, 1949).

25

one enforced on women through dichotomies that necessarily situate men and women in
contrasting positions, whereby he is the subject and she is the object77. As mentioned in the
previous chapter, this conception of otherness originates from Sartre’s third ontological
dimension, whereby subjective embodiment becomes intersubjective. Nevertheless,
Beauvoir’s standpoint, like Merleau-Ponty’s, is the body’s view towards the world. As
Cataldi78 adds, the body is the base of being, and it is the body that allows for this becoming
woman.
The embodied subject, le corps propre, Leib, is a subject in its own right. In her review
of the Phenomenology of Perception, Beauvoir agrees with Merleau-Ponty on the principle that
our bodies should not be seen as objects. This may entail that bodies are perceived as means of
communication to the world rather than instruments among other instruments79. This
philosophical affinity with Merleau-Ponty stems from her leaning on three main ideas
presented in the Phenomenology of Perception; the living body, the sexed body, and
experience’s temporal nature. This is especially interesting, since Merleau-Ponty writes about
sexuality not as a function, as one would assume after reading the section above, but as part of
existence’s expression80.
In her review, what she begins with and truly appreciates, is the elimination of the
dualist understanding of subject-object; specifically, she argues that it is impossible to define
the object as detached from the subject, to cut it off. This is due to the nature of objects; being
for the subject and the subject revealing itself by engaging with objects81. On that note, she
emphasizes her agreement with him on the body not being an object, not even a
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special/privileged kind of object. She highlights that our body is not positioned in the world
like a pawn on a chess board, but the body lives in it, it is the expression and realization of our
existence82. The sensuous experience our body has, is the way of communication with the
world, as she writes tissu intentionell83.
However, it is in The Second Sex where a feminist phenomenological explanation of
objectification is expressed as imposed on women by restrictions such as; items of clothing or
cultural practices. She argues that the body in flesh and bones should not be taken as definite;
in The Data of Biology84 Beauvoir emphasizes that biological bodily indicators should not
determine neither the individual characteristics of the subject, nor the social life. In this sense,
Beauvoir draws on Merleau-Ponty’s rejection of the limiting biological understanding of the
body, and so also rejecting Husserl’s Körper.85
The biological body is forced to be gendered. This is one of the fundamental views in
Beauvoir’s philosophy, as seen throughout history, women have been exploited specifically
because of their biological features. For example, forced prostitution, as well as, the ability to
give birth and breastfeed children. This is a major change of perspective in relation to female
existence, as women are not just their bodies, and by extension the latter’s abilities and features.
It is from this view that the subject-object dichotomy emerges; with the man being the subject
and the woman the object. The male subject symbolizes reason, while the woman is her own
body, the object given to the male subject86. This theorization represents the starting point of
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contemporary feminist phenomenologists who criticize the dichotomy, nevertheless building
on it.
II.

Beyond Beauvoir: Sexual Difference
While Beauvoir inaugurated the possibility of a feminist phenomenology, there were a

number of issues that remained questionable in her work, namely the traditional dichotomy
between the Absolute (male) and the Other (female)87. This binary is addressed through more
recent feminists such as Luce Irigaray and Judith Butler. The question of the body and
embodiment cannot be ignored by feminists. In fact, as Grosz argues88, if one is to discard or
deny the importance of embodiment within the feminist scholarship, then it would be treated
the same way as it was when only a masculine consciousness89 was discussed and imposed on
the body, whereby the body as mere vessel, was attributed to the woman.
Irigaray in An Ethics of Sexual Difference90 reads through Merleau-Ponty’s The Visible
and the Invisible and at first agrees with the return to pre-discursive experience where subjectobject divisions are paused. In fact, she writes:
“Up to this point, my reading and interpretation of the history of philosophy
agree with Merleau-Ponty: we must go back to a moment of prediscursive experience,
recommence everything, all the categories by which we understand things, the world,
subject-object divisions, recommence everything and pause at the “mystery, as familiar
as it is unexplained, of a light which, illuminating the rest, remains at its source in
obscurity.” 91

The mystery she is referring to is the mystery of sexual difference, or as she calls it “the
issue of time”92. Irigaray criticizes the way philosophy, science, and language have been
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claimed by men; starting from the description of the subject always written in the masculine
form. Man is always at the center of politics, theory, and discourse93. Man is the creator of
space and time, carefully situating women and their bodies within certain spaces, roles, and
identities. One of the very important roles and identity she focuses on is the feminine-maternal.
This theme of motherhood and the fecund body of women is recurrent in her work and is the
standpoint for her critique of Merleau-Pontian body. She especially focuses on the way he
describes the relationship of the body to world and vice versa. Much of the critique is offered
in the Ethics of Sexual Difference is on Merleau-Ponty’s The Visible and the Invisible, but what
exactly is she critiquing and reworking? The object of inquiry is the visible, Merleau-Ponty
defines it as follows:
“The flesh is not matter, in the sense of corpuscles of being which would add
up or continue on one another to form beings. Nor is the visible (the things as
well as my own body) some “psychic” material that would be— God knows
how— brought into being by the things factually existing and acting on my
factual body.”94

But it is how he describes the visible, as a light which remains in obscurity, that raises
questions. The way he brings it to language and describes it as a close intimacy like the one
between the sea and the strand95. This, she reads it as an unconscious, almost implicit,
description of intrauterine life. The visible, the mother, is in this intrauterine limbo, where all
she sees is from her mother perspective. The latter resurrects the idea of the feminine other,
again by attributing the visible to women. Her reading of the text is not just in the form of a
commentary, but is also a philosophical and psychoanalytic engagement. What Irigaray is
pointing at is that the intelligibility of bodies between mother and fetus erases sexual difference
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because the mother from visible becomes invisible, and her role as child bearer surfaces and
she, as a subject, is erased. This erasure is what leads to the erasure of sexual difference.
However, as Butler96 comments, this very criticism, the erasure of sexual difference of
the body, in reality is an affinity, since Irigaray’s reading of Merleau-Ponty resembles the way
he outlines the flesh97 and the body. Both engaging with one another. Through her engagement
with the text, Irigaray, recaptures sexual difference by proposing her reading as evidence that
in erasing sexual difference, Merleau-Ponty is actually locating it at the core of the body. As
Butler explains:
“Irigaray textually enacts a kind of entanglement that suggests that the
"outside" to phallogocentrism is to be found "within" its own terms, that the feminine
is insinuated into the terms of phallogocentrism, rendering equivocal the question,
whose voice is it, masculine or feminine?”98
Nevertheless, Irigaray’s understanding is not of a masculine-subject versus a feminineobject, but rather a constitutive one. Whereby, the subject (man) cannot be without the object
(woman); the exclusion of the feminine from the discourse of body and embodiment in itself
is constitutive. The condition of male being is negative, it is only through the negation of the
feminine that the masculine comes to being; returning to Beauvoir’s dichotomy. The same
dichotomy she initially wanted to overcome. Butler99 also emphasizes the inadequacy of
Irigaray’s question on how to treat the other, the feminine, well. Butler 100 states that the other
for Merleau-Ponty is not really the other, as his intersubjectivity does not entail the alienated
other of Husserl’s object. Rather, it is a social other who communicates through his/her body.
Like her contemporaries, Irigaray attempts to go beyond the dichotomies suggesting that sex
and gender are irrelevant as they force us to consider bodily characteristics as features that
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determine subjectivity. However, as Butler points out her reading of Merleau-Ponty resurrects
the dichotomy in a way that makes the feminine indispensable to the masculine.
Why is this important for the feminist reading of embodiment? In Performative Acts
and Gender Constitution101, Butler clearly points out that if we are only to take the female
body as constitutive of the female subject, through a naturalistic approach, all we are left with
is a limited embodied experience. An experience relegated only to the roles and functions the
female biological body can perform, such as; giving birth and breastfeeding for example. This
is why the difference between sex, the biological, and gender, the constructed, was introduced;
to avoid the relegation of female experience only to certain social dimension.
This rejection of naturalism in regards to the embodied body is also present in both
Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, as elucidated in the previous chapter. Butler cites Merleau-Ponty
and Beauvoir when it comes to defining the body. Its facticity, its materiality, in a way is denied
and the claim of the body being an historical idea is highlighted. By historical it is meant the
process by which the body becomes infused with cultural meaning, and this cannot possibly be
a simple biological complex organism. The body is a process by which cultural and historical
opportunities become embodied.
Thus, the body becomes a set of possibilities not related by the perception of the other
or predetermined by its essence102. This entails that the body is not just physical, or at least its
materiality does not bear importance, as much as the meanings it holds. Those meanings,
according to Beauvoir, have been imposed and imparted on women from men.
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III.

Beyond Beauvoir: Bodily Movement
This relegation to certain bodily roles and meanings has been developed by Iris Marion

Young in Throwing Like a Girl, as an inability to have specific embodied experiences. She
applied Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological approach to examine the difference between
masculine and feminine103 bodies. She noticed that these appear early on in childhood whereby
whole-body movements is present in boys and not in girls. This statement was a result of
observation of children while running, playing baseball, and doing sports in general. While
boys tended to move all of their body parts, girls only moved the body part involved in the
activity, i.e., if a girl was to throw a ball, she would only move her arm104. Young relates this
inability of girls to perform certain actions to three modalities of feminine motility; inhibited
intentionality105, ambiguous transcendence106, and discontinuous unity107108.
These three modalities, she explains, are the result of the woman embodied experience
as subject and object simultaneously. By object, Young means thing, not even Körper. These
modalities stem from her reading of Merleau-Pontian intentionality as located in the body.
Because intentionality is located in the body, feminine body motility is characterized by both
an “I can” and an “I cannot”. As a subject her body, should have skills and abilities by which
it approaches the world around her guided by her intentions. However, what Young is arguing
is that her embodied experience, because affected by both subjectivity and objectivity, is
perhaps characterized by a “one can” instead of “I can”. There is a consistent disbelief in her
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own body’s ability to move. Hence, the feminine body is never fully a subject capable of
transcendence109, but is pervaded by immanence which keeps her to the status of object. But
why are women bodies unable to perform whole-body movements, are women embodied
differently? Before answering this question however, she stresses the importance of not taking
this a universal particular. This understanding of female embodiment is not necessarily the
same for women in societies different from her own, urban, industrial Western societies. And
this relates to the answer she offers, the body as a socio-historical idea. An argument picked
up from Merleau-Ponty and Beauvoir.
Thus, the object of inquiry is how women learn to act in a certain way, the manner in
which girls are socialized to be unable to mobilize their bodily resources unlike their male
counterparts. This is done through the process of young girls acquiring a feminine gender,
through which they will acquire a feminine body by extension. Hence, this is not just an
application of Merleau-Ponty’s ideas on how the subject drives towards the world and does
that by using his/her bodily skills, but it is also a criticism. If we are to believe that the embodied
subject is not defined by its biological body, but rather his/her interactions with the world, other
subjects, socialization, cultural practices, and so on there is still a co-option of female
embodiment. The body, let it be Körper, Leib, or Leibkörper is still gendered.

IV.

Beyond Beauvoir and Beyond Dichotomies
By now, it is very obvious that the majority of feminist phenomenology is more

interested in reading Merleau-Ponty’s work; while feminist engagement with Husserl’s theory
of the body is rather limited and not as developed110. The reason behind this, is the role that
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Körper plays in the twofold-ness of embodiment. As discussed by Beauvoir, Irigaray, and
Butler, the return to pre-discursive subjectivity where biological features do not play a
significant role, is one of the foundational pillars for feminist phenomenology. However,
simply because a theory of body indicates a strong Körper-Leib relation, it does not necessarily
mean that it should not be engaged with. This may lead to a weak feminist philosophical
foundation of the phenomenological body, since even if we are to correctly assume that the
constitution of the subject is an historical process, we are still tied to this world by being
embodied.
Secondly, it may be considered as poor intellectual practice; disregarding a theory
simply because it does not fit or it is not easy. This is neither to diminish the Merleau-Pontian
phenomenology, nor to crunch feminist reworkings of his notion which have also been critical
for his failure to address sexual difference. This statement is a simple intellectual trigger, meant
to enrich the literature. In fact, this is where, I would like to bring to the table Alia Al-Saji111’s
reworking of Husserlian embodiment through his account of touch; inspired by the works of
Gail Weiss112and Sara Heinämaa113. On one hand, Weiss highlights the systematic and rigorous
character of Husserlian phenomenology and the possibility its methodology holds for feminist
theory114. On the other, Heinämaa is more focused on how influential Ideas II was for
Beauvoir’s philosophy of the male-female /subject-object theorization.
Al-Saji appeals to Husserl’s double sensing body. The latter is both a sensing and
sensed object, it is a Corporeal body115, not because it is at once sensed as an object, and then
is itself sensing other objects. Instead, she chooses to read it as an ability of the body to be both
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at the different times for different purposes, leaning toward the instrumentalization of a subject
embedded in the world. Which, is very much similar to the flexibility displayed by MerleauPontian embodiment. The twofold-ness of Husserlian embodiment is no longer viewed as
philosophical liability with the heavy weight of a natural Körper, but rather as an ability to be
sensing and sensed without the need of being in opposition to another object. This way
embodiment becomes a plurality of sensing, it can do and be multiple things at the same time
through sensation, perception, movement. All which intertwine in the body creating the
richness of embodied experience116. Thus, her main argument is to claim that the body is really
constituted through touch which would not need to involve an opposite object. This is indeed
a radical shift in feminist perspectives because this way, the subject does not need an object to
constitute itself because it is both at once. This reading can be a turning point because it would
really un-stuck feminist theory from the pattern of situating male-subject and female-subject
in an either-or relation.
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Chapter Three
Returning to the Phenomenological Body

In the previous chapter, different feminist approaches to Husserlian and Merleau-Pontian
phenomenology have been examined. I have located the phenomenological turn in feminist
theory within the work of Simone de Beauvoir, who revised the notions of body and
embodiment offered by Husserl, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty.117 Her reworking allowed a
feminist interpretation of embodied subjectivity and experience of women not linked to the
biological gendered body. Which, however, resurfaces under a different form, the body of
ambiguous transcendence. A body which is an historical idea with a gender that is constructed
by cultural practices and the co-option of society.
The turn of phenomenology in feminist theory seems to need, what I call in this thesis, a
return to the phenomenological body. In this chapter, I mark this return in Alia Al-Saji’s essay
Bodies and sensings: On the uses of Husserlian phenomenology for feminist theory, not only
because it offers a new interpretation of Husserlian theory that goes beyond criticizing his
Körper; but also, because it allows the constitution of the female subject and her embodiment
beyond the barriers of dichotomies.

I.

The Dissatisfaction of Theory

Al-Saji begins by asking a very important question; are feminists ready to rethink the
classical understandings of the body, as being on the other side of the dichotomy, namely;
other, object, passive, instrumental, and subordinated to reason? This is a particularly salient
question, because the problem here is not merely of reading a text, identify the dichotomy, and
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overcome it. But is rather a problem of situating ourselves phenomenologically. As I read
feminist texts, there is this pattern of engagement which involves the insertion of oneself within
the examined theory. Like the carving of a space for a feminist subject in a discourse where it
does not belong. It is a dialectical power struggle between the female reader and male writer;
where the negation of the female subject in discourse is the constitution of the male
philosophical authority, falling once again in the subject-object framework. This is very much
the criticism and praise, in a sense, that Butler raised when writing about Irigaray writing about
Merleau-Ponty.
I argue that if we are really to develop sound feminist phenomenology, we must change
our point of view. By point of view, I mean the way we situate ourselves as female subjects
not just in the literature, but in the world. It is like the hand example provided by both Husserl
and Merleau-Ponty, to overcome the dichotomy, we need to stop situating ourselves,
metaphorically speaking, in the left hand, the object of intentionality of the right hand. Nor we
should be the latter. Instead, we should begin the inquiry from the standpoint of the subject
whose hands are touching one another. When scholars like Irigaray and Butler attempt to go
beyond the dichotomy they remain trapped in it, because sexual difference and gender remain
the object of inquiry, but are also fundamental in the constitution of the subject inquiring.
They have criticized Merleau-Ponty for erasing sexual difference by blurring the lines
between visible and invisible; however, praised his work for allowing the body to become an
historical idea, and by extension making embodiment non-biological. The obsession with the
non-biological body is both productive and counter-productive. Productive because it attempts
to dissociate the traditional gender roles attributed to women because of their physical features.
However, it is counterproductive for two reasons; first, because we are embodied beings. In
both Husserlian and Merleau-Pontian our relation to the world is focused in our body, make
that because of touch, movement, perception, and so our view of the world is necessarily
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conditioned by how we feel. Second, when the body is only an historical idea, and embodiment
the by-product of memories and behaviour, then it is going to be shaped based on elements
outside of one self. When I say outside of me, I mean the behaviour and perception of others
about myself. This way the subject is really stripped of her own agency in creating and
constituting herself, since it becomes contingent to all those practices that co-opt women118
This is where Al-Saji’s work can contribute, she argues that, besides the natural body119,
another reason for feminists to doubt in Husserl is his phenomenological reduction; whereby
our natural attitude is bracketed away and with it, our Körper with its gender. The result of this
bracketing is a universalized consciousness, which is for obvious reason masculine120, and what
is being excluded, bracketed away, is the feminine body. This interpretation and criticism are
very similar to the ones raised against Merleau-Ponty’s visible. And so, it appears that the
erasure of sexual difference, the allowing of non-biological embodiment, and the bracketing of
a naturally gendered body are not enough. Nevertheless, it is important to highlight that it is
only in contemporary Husserlian scholarship121 that we rediscover his appreciation for the
body. Also, it is important to highlight that for Husserl the main aim of his phenomenological
investigations was not the body itself. Rather, he wanted to create the foundations of all the
human sciences. In fact, his philosophical foundations provide the space to develop more
socially and culturally understandings of embodiment.

II.

Breaking Free from The Hand of Minas
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I argue that this more inclusive, yet premature, notion of embodiment needs to rework
one major problem; the female body as trapped in opposition to the male one. For the
development of this aspect of embodiment, Al-Saji suggests touch as a way ahead. Touch, is
re-discovered in his theory of sensing, Empfindnisse, elucidated in Ideas II. In this theory,
Husserl attempts to connect both touch and kinaesthesis122to create a more dynamic
understanding of sensation. Empfindnisse is actually the combination of two important
dimensions of the body, lived experience and sensation. It also represents the kind of sensuous
experience that is lived through without being objectified, it is that pre-intentional stage of
sensuous experience which characterizes the lived body.123124 I quote the same passage Al-Saji
cites from Husserl:
“Moving my hand over the table, I get an experience of it and its thingly
determinations. At the same time, I can at any moment pay attention to my hand and
find on it touch-sensations, sensations of smoothness and coldness, etc. In the interior
of the hand running parallel to the experienced movement, I find motion-sensations,
etc. Lifting a thing, I experience its weight, but at the same time I have weightsensations localized in my Body. And thus, my Body’s entering into physical relations
(by striking, pressing, pushing, etc.) with other material things provides in general not
only the experience of physical occurrences, related to the Body and to things, but also
the experience of specifically Bodily occurrences of the type we call sensings. Such
occurrences are missing in ‘‘merely’’ material things” 125
This example can be reconnected to the previous hand example provided in Chapter
One. The goal of this example and of sensings, is the differentiation between my own bodily
self-awareness and my body as very own. Me touching the table is the kind of experience that
I live through without self-ascribing to my body, to do that I need to be in the context where I
differentiate myself from the other, I need to make the table the object of my intentionality.
Nevertheless, the element of novelty in sensings is movement, that element that provides
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temporal continuity, that same unity that was lacking in the feminine body described by Young.
Sensings can also have an affective dimension. This means that, as explained when the concept
of double sensing was introduced previously, the body is both touching the world but is also
touched by it. Very much of what Merleau-Ponty has to say about the body and the universe,
both are made of the same fabric.126 Sensings becomes a central theme in Husserl, especially
because our body is covered in skin, the largest sensing organ. And so, the body is constantly
and intimately in contact with itself, others, and the world. Thus, the body is a living surface
which can and is affected. Affectivity, indeed, is Al-Saji point of entrance for a feminist
interpretation of Husserl’s theory. As she writes:
“Specifically, this affectivity means that, while perceiving or being-acted upon by the
world, the body feels and undergoes this experience in terms of sensings. ‘‘Sensings’’
is a concept that, I think, can be used to undermine the dichotomies of activity and
passivity and of subject and object as applied to living bodies. It offers a conceptual
tool for feminism in its theorization of embodiment as affectively lived in whatever it
does or undergoes, as dynamic and resistant while at once objectified. To see this, we
need to turn to Husserl’s account of how sensings are localized and come to constitute
a living body”.127
Unsurprisingly, the account she is referring to is double-sensing, an notion initially
understood by feminists as inadequate because of its relation to Körper. When sensings is
localized in or on the body, it is perceived from both within and without, like in the case of my
body touching itself, i.e., my two hands touching one another example. Why is this so important
for a better understanding of embodiment? Because in self-perception (me touching myself), I
appear to myself as a living body and not as an extended substance. As Husserl writes:
‘‘On this surface of the hand I sense the sensations of touch, etc. And it is precisely
thereby that this surface manifest itself immediately as my Body.’’ 128129
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The Husserlian account in question, actually avoids the subject-object dichotomy which
feminist criticized Merleau-Ponty for. Because in the Phenomenology of Perception the
touching-touched bodily experience is described as a subject-object kind of relation. While for
Husserl, double-sensing is not my right hand being subject and actively touching the other,
while my left-hand slides into passivity. The Merleau-Pontian account is taken as if my left
hand cannot feel itself being touched by my right hand; which is relatively dubious. And this
interpretation can become problematic, because if the experience is already being described
from the male view point, then, as the male subject engages with the female subject, she is
thrown into passivity like my left hand. This would not only include female subjects, but rather
all subjects. As if the male subject absorbs the activity of the female subject, and her embodied
experience is that of an object, constantly trapped in the dichotomy.
Thus, feminist criticisms of Merleau-Ponty are correct, and not unfounded at all.
However, what the Merleau-Pontian account is really targeting is the absence of coincidence
of sensation, for him is more of a giving and taking. Non-coincidence is important because it
helps him avoid a situation where touching-touched do not fuse in one single sensation, in
which case subject-object would become one. A monism he is not trying to achieve. This marks
a vital difference between Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. The former finds the touching-touched
relation as a localized tactile experience, while for the latter is a form of reflective
consciousness130.
The major problem here is understanding if touch, like the Hand of Minas131, turns
subjects into objects. For Husserl this would be a no, because through sensings, when the body
is being touched, it does not lose its ability to touch. While for Merleau-Ponty, a temporary
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“exchange of abilities” occurs. If my Leib is being touched, it does not automatically turn into
Körper, because by being touched my body is still also sensing the touch of the thing or the
person whose touching it132
It is in this understanding of touch, that feminist phenomenology can make a return to
an understanding of embodiment that does not involve a strict dichotomy of subject-object,
self-other, active-passive, and ultimately male-female. This theoretical base can really open up
possibilities for the body and embodiment whereby the subject forms his/herself within the
world they live in. If my body is does not lose its subject status while interacting with other
subjects, then differences like gender, race, religion, appearances, and more become selfgenerating. By self-generating I meant the process through which one understands where
certain modes of embodiment come from. If my embodied experience as a woman is that of a
limiting and painful one, whereby my body is being co-opted into being touched and perceived
as an object of male pleasure for example; the problem lays in the perception of the male
subject, and not in my body or in my experience of embodiment.

Conclusion
The importance of the thesis lays in the support of a return to a more flexible interpretation of
a Husserlian understanding of the touching-touched body, because it does not only provide a
solution for the strict dichotomies in which almost all feminists find themselves in, but it points
to a rather more difficult problem; the other. The other which affects the embodied experience
of women negatively. The thesis discussed how women are often objectified because of their
bodies, and how they are co-opted to lose their subject status to be the object of men.
Phenomenology and its feminist critique helped explain this phenomenon and develop a new
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understanding of female embodiment. But feminist phenomenologists get trapped in de
Beauvoirian dichotomies, and so a return to the Husserlian notion of touch can help escape
from dichotomies.
Finally, I would like to conclude by saying that I learnt a lot during the writing process,
especially because I initially believed that Merleau-Ponty’s position on the body as being an
historical idea was correct. However, through research’s progression I realised it was not the
case. I strongly believe that this account of touch must be developed further especially because
it could solve the issue of dichotomies not only in the field of gender but also race.
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